Wind Aggregation Via Risky Power Markets

Yue Zhao, Junjie Qin, Ram Rajagopal, Andrea Goldsmith, H. Vincent Poor

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

35 Scopus citations

Abstract

Aggregation of diverse wind power sources can effectively reduce their uncertainty, and hence the cost of wind energy integration. A risky power contract is proposed, by which wind power producers (WPPs) can trade uncertain future power for efficient wind aggregation. A two-settlement market with both the risky power contract and a conventional firm power contract is shown to have a unique competitive equilibrium (CE), characterized in closed form. The marginal contribution and diversity contribution of each WPP to the group of all WPPs are fairly reflected in the profit earned by this WPP at the CE. Moreover, the CE achieves the same total profit as achieved by a grand coalition of WPPs. In a coalitional game setting, the profit allocation induced by the CE is always in the core, and is achieved via a non-cooperative risky power market. The benefits of the risky power market are demonstrated using wind generation and locational marginal price data for ten WPPs in the PJM interconnection.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number6913576
Pages (from-to)1571-1581
Number of pages11
JournalIEEE Transactions on Power Systems
Volume30
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1 2015

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Energy Engineering and Power Technology
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Keywords

  • Coalitional game
  • competitive equilibrium
  • power market
  • renewable energy integration
  • wind aggregation

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