TY - CHAP
T1 - When are nonanonymous players negligible?
AU - Fudenberg, Drew
AU - Levine, David
AU - Pesendorfer, Wolfgang
N1 - Funding Information:
* The authors are grateful for financial support from National Science Foundation Grants SBR-9424013, SBR-9320695, SBR-9409180, and the UCLA Academic Senate. We also thank Christina Molinari for her comments. We are especially grateful to an anonymous Associate Editor and Referee for their prompt and careful comments.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2009 by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. All rights reserved.
PY - 2008/1/1
Y1 - 2008/1/1
N2 - We examine games played by a single large player and a large number of opponents who are small, but not anonymous. If the play of the small players is observed with noise, and if the number of actions the large player controls is bounded as the number of small players grows, the equilibrium set converges to that of the game where there is a continuum of small players. This paper extends previous work on the negligibility of small players by dropping the assumption that small players’ actions are “anonymous.” That is, we allow each small player's actions to be observed separately, instead of supposing that the small players’ actions are only observed through their effect on an aggregate statistic. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73.
AB - We examine games played by a single large player and a large number of opponents who are small, but not anonymous. If the play of the small players is observed with noise, and if the number of actions the large player controls is bounded as the number of small players grows, the equilibrium set converges to that of the game where there is a continuum of small players. This paper extends previous work on the negligibility of small players by dropping the assumption that small players’ actions are “anonymous.” That is, we allow each small player's actions to be observed separately, instead of supposing that the small players’ actions are only observed through their effect on an aggregate statistic. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73.
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U2 - 10.1142/9789812818478_0006
DO - 10.1142/9789812818478_0006
M3 - Chapter
AN - SCOPUS:84970965874
SN - 9812818464
SN - 9789812818461
SP - 95
EP - 120
BT - A Long-Run Collaboration on Long-Run Games
PB - World Scientific Publishing Co.
ER -