TY - JOUR
T1 - What Physical Layer Security Can Do for 6G Security
AU - Mitev, Miroslav
AU - Chorti, Arsenia
AU - Vincent Poor, H.
AU - Fettweis, Gerhard P.
N1 - Funding Information:
This work is financed on the basis of the budget passed by the Saxon State Parliament. The work of H. V. Poor is supported by the U.S National Science Foundation under Grants CCF-1908308 and CNS-2128448.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 IEEE.
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - While existing security protocols were designed with a focus on the core network, the enhancement of the security of the B5G access network becomes of critical importance. Despite the strengthening of 5G security protocols with respect to LTE, there are still open issues that have not been fully addressed. This work is articulated around the premise that rethinking the security design bottom up, starting at the physical layer, is not only viable in 6G but importantly, arises as an efficient way to overcome security hurdles in novel use cases, notably massive machine type communications (mMTC), ultra reliable low latency communications (URLLC) and autonomous cyberphysical systems. Unlike existing review papers that treat physical layer security orthogonally to cryptography, we will try to provide a few insights of underlying connections. Discussing many practical issues, we will present a comprehensive review of the state-of the-art in i) secret key generation from shared randomness, ii) the wiretap channels and fundamental limits, iii) authentication of devices using physical unclonable functions (PUFs), localization and multi-factor authentication, and, iv) jamming attacks at the physical layer. We finally conclude with the proposers' aspirations for the 6G security landscape, in the hyper-connectivity and semantic communications era.
AB - While existing security protocols were designed with a focus on the core network, the enhancement of the security of the B5G access network becomes of critical importance. Despite the strengthening of 5G security protocols with respect to LTE, there are still open issues that have not been fully addressed. This work is articulated around the premise that rethinking the security design bottom up, starting at the physical layer, is not only viable in 6G but importantly, arises as an efficient way to overcome security hurdles in novel use cases, notably massive machine type communications (mMTC), ultra reliable low latency communications (URLLC) and autonomous cyberphysical systems. Unlike existing review papers that treat physical layer security orthogonally to cryptography, we will try to provide a few insights of underlying connections. Discussing many practical issues, we will present a comprehensive review of the state-of the-art in i) secret key generation from shared randomness, ii) the wiretap channels and fundamental limits, iii) authentication of devices using physical unclonable functions (PUFs), localization and multi-factor authentication, and, iv) jamming attacks at the physical layer. We finally conclude with the proposers' aspirations for the 6G security landscape, in the hyper-connectivity and semantic communications era.
KW - 5G
KW - 6G
KW - physical layer security
KW - physical unclonable functions
KW - secret key generation
KW - wiretap coding
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U2 - 10.1109/OJVT.2023.3245071
DO - 10.1109/OJVT.2023.3245071
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85149397764
SN - 2644-1330
VL - 4
SP - 375
EP - 388
JO - IEEE Open Journal of Vehicular Technology
JF - IEEE Open Journal of Vehicular Technology
ER -