Abstract
One possibility is to accept that scientific knowledge is limited in an important respect. A complete scientific explanation for human color perception leaves something out: it doesn’t supply Mary with what she needs to know what it’s like to experience color. First-person experience can supply something that falls beyond the scope of science - something that cannot be captured by a scientific explanation. Philosophers and scientists have debated the correct response to Frank Jackson’s argument, with no clear consensus. But anecdotal evidence suggests that for many people, the view that first-person experience can supply something that falls beyond the scope of science is especially compelling. One piece of evidence for people’s “intuitive dualism” comes from a clever study by J. L. Preston, R. S. Ritter, and J. Hepler. They had people read about the psychology of love, but only some people were given additional information about the neuroscience of love.
Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | What is Scientific Knowledge? |
Subtitle of host publication | An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology of Science |
Publisher | Taylor and Francis |
Pages | 260-273 |
Number of pages | 14 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781351336611 |
ISBN (Print) | 9781138570160 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 1 2019 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- General Arts and Humanities