TY - GEN
T1 - Welfare Distribution in Two-sided Random Matching Markets
AU - Ashlagi, Itai
AU - Braverman, Mark
AU - Zhao, Geng
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 Owner/Author(s).
PY - 2023/7/9
Y1 - 2023/7/9
N2 - We study the welfare structure in two-sided matching markets when agents have latent preferences generated according to observed characteristics. Specifically, we are interested in the empirical welfare distribution of agents on each side of the market under stable outcomes as well as the relation between the outcomes of each side of the market.
AB - We study the welfare structure in two-sided matching markets when agents have latent preferences generated according to observed characteristics. Specifically, we are interested in the empirical welfare distribution of agents on each side of the market under stable outcomes as well as the relation between the outcomes of each side of the market.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85168159744&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85168159744&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/3580507.3597730
DO - 10.1145/3580507.3597730
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85168159744
T3 - EC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
SP - 122
BT - EC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
PB - Association for Computing Machinery, Inc
T2 - 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2023
Y2 - 9 July 2023 through 12 July 2023
ER -