TY - JOUR
T1 - Valuing alternative work arrangements
AU - Mas, Alexandre
AU - Pallais, Amanda
N1 - Funding Information:
* Mas: Industrial Relations Section, Simpson International Building, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, and NBER, and IZA (email: [email protected]); Pallais: Department of Economics, Harvard University, Littauer Center, Cambridge, MA 02138, and NBER (email: [email protected]). This paper was accepted to the AER under the guidance of Hillary Hoynes, Coeditor. We would like to thank Jason Abaluck, Joshua Angrist, David Autor, David Card, Henry Farber, Edward Freeland, Claudia Goldin, Nathan Hendren, Lawrence Katz, Patrick Kline, Alan Krueger, Claudia Olivetti, Jesse Shapiro, Basit Zafar, and seminar participants at the Advances with Field Experiments conference, Brown University, CEMFI, CEPR/IZA Annual Labour Economics Symposium, Cornell University, Executive Office of the President of the United States, Harvard University, MIT, NBER Summer Institute, Northwestern University, SOLE Annual Meeting, Stanford University, Tufts University, UC Berkeley, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, University College London, University of Chicago, University of Michigan, University of Tel Aviv, University of Zürich, Wellesley College, and Wharton for their many helpful comments and suggestions. We would also like to thank Jenna Anders, Stephanie Cheng, Kevin DeLuca, Jason Goldrosen, Disa Hynsjo, and Carl Lieberman for outstanding research assistance. Financial support from NSF CAREER grant no. 1454476 is gratefully acknowledged. The project described in this paper relies on data from a survey administered by the Understanding America Study, which is maintained by the Center for Economic and Social Research (CESR) at the University of Southern California. The content of this paper is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of USC or UAS. This project received IRB approval from Princeton (0000006906) and Harvard (15-0673). This study can be found in the AEA RCT Registry (AEARCTR-0001250). The authors declare that they have no relevant or material financial interests that relate to the research described in this paper.
PY - 2017/12
Y1 - 2017/12
N2 - We employ a discrete choice experiment in the employment process for a national call center to estimate the willingness to pay distribution for alternative work arrangements relative to traditional office positions. Most workers are not willing to pay for scheduling flexibility, though a tail of workers with high valuations allows for sizable compensating differentials. The average worker is willing to give up 20 percent of wages to avoid a schedule set by an employer on short notice, and 8 percent for the option to work from home. We also document that many job-seekers are inattentive, and we account for this in estimation.
AB - We employ a discrete choice experiment in the employment process for a national call center to estimate the willingness to pay distribution for alternative work arrangements relative to traditional office positions. Most workers are not willing to pay for scheduling flexibility, though a tail of workers with high valuations allows for sizable compensating differentials. The average worker is willing to give up 20 percent of wages to avoid a schedule set by an employer on short notice, and 8 percent for the option to work from home. We also document that many job-seekers are inattentive, and we account for this in estimation.
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U2 - 10.1257/aer.20161500
DO - 10.1257/aer.20161500
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85038626296
SN - 0002-8282
VL - 107
SP - 3722
EP - 3759
JO - American Economic Review
JF - American Economic Review
IS - 12
ER -