Updating: Learning versus supposing

Jiaying Zhao, Vincenzo Crupi, Katya Tentori, Branden Fitelson, Daniel Osherson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

12 Scopus citations

Abstract

Bayesian orthodoxy posits a tight relationship between conditional probability and updating. Namely, the probability of an event A after learning B should equal the conditional probability of A given B prior to learning B. We examine whether ordinary judgment conforms to the orthodox view. In three experiments we found substantial differences between the conditional probability of an event A supposing an event B compared to the probability of A after having learned B. Specifically, supposing B appears to have less impact on the credibility of A than learning that B is true.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)373-378
Number of pages6
JournalCognition
Volume124
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2012

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
  • Language and Linguistics
  • Developmental and Educational Psychology
  • Linguistics and Language
  • Cognitive Neuroscience

Keywords

  • Belief updating
  • Probability
  • Reasoning

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