Updating beliefs in light of uncertain evidence: Descriptive assessment of Jeffrey's rule

Jiaying Zhao; Daniel Osherson

doi:10.1080/13546783.2010.521695

Updating beliefs in light of uncertain evidence: Descriptive assessment of Jeffrey's rule

Jiaying Zhao, Daniel Osherson

Psychology

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

29 Scopus citations

Abstract

Jeffrey (1983) proposed a generalisation of conditioning as a means of updating probability distributions when new evidence drives no event to certainty. His rule requires the stability of certain conditional probabilities through time. We tested this assumption ("invariance") from the psychological point of view. In Experiment 1 participants offered probability estimates for events in Jeffrey's candlelight example. Two further scenarios were investigated in Experiment 2, one in which invariance seems justified, the other in which it does not. Results were in rough conformity to Jeffrey's (1983) principle.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	288-307
Number of pages	20
Journal	Thinking and Reasoning
Volume	16
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2010.521695
State	Published - Nov 2010

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Philosophy
Psychology (miscellaneous)

Keywords

Belief updating
Jeffrey's rule
Reasoning

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10.1080/13546783.2010.521695

Cite this

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abstract = "Jeffrey (1983) proposed a generalisation of conditioning as a means of updating probability distributions when new evidence drives no event to certainty. His rule requires the stability of certain conditional probabilities through time. We tested this assumption ({"}invariance{"}) from the psychological point of view. In Experiment 1 participants offered probability estimates for events in Jeffrey's candlelight example. Two further scenarios were investigated in Experiment 2, one in which invariance seems justified, the other in which it does not. Results were in rough conformity to Jeffrey's (1983) principle.",

keywords = "Belief updating, Jeffrey's rule, Reasoning",

author = "Jiaying Zhao and Daniel Osherson",

note = "Funding Information: Correspondence should be address to Jiaying Zhao, Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Green Hall, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA. E-mail: jiayingz@princeton.edu We thank Nick Chater, David Over, Mike Oaksford, Steven Sloman, and an anonymous reviewer for very helpful comments. The research reported here was facilitated by a grant from the Henry Luce Foundation.",

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doi = "10.1080/13546783.2010.521695",

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T2 - Descriptive assessment of Jeffrey's rule

AU - Zhao, Jiaying

AU - Osherson, Daniel

N1 - Funding Information: Correspondence should be address to Jiaying Zhao, Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Green Hall, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA. E-mail: jiayingz@princeton.edu We thank Nick Chater, David Over, Mike Oaksford, Steven Sloman, and an anonymous reviewer for very helpful comments. The research reported here was facilitated by a grant from the Henry Luce Foundation.

PY - 2010/11

Y1 - 2010/11

N2 - Jeffrey (1983) proposed a generalisation of conditioning as a means of updating probability distributions when new evidence drives no event to certainty. His rule requires the stability of certain conditional probabilities through time. We tested this assumption ("invariance") from the psychological point of view. In Experiment 1 participants offered probability estimates for events in Jeffrey's candlelight example. Two further scenarios were investigated in Experiment 2, one in which invariance seems justified, the other in which it does not. Results were in rough conformity to Jeffrey's (1983) principle.

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KW - Reasoning

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Updating beliefs in light of uncertain evidence: Descriptive assessment of Jeffrey's rule

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Keywords

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