Unobservable investment and the hold-up problem

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

49 Scopus citations


We study a two-person bargaining problem in which the buyer may invest and increase his valuation of the object before bargaining. We show that if all offers are made by the seller and the time between offers is small, then the buyer invests efficiently and the seller extracts all of the surplus. Hence, bargaining with frequently repeated offers remedies the hold-up problem even when the agent who makes the relation-specific investment has no bargaining power and contracting is not possible. We consider alternative formulations with uncertain gains from trade or two-sided investment.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)343-376
Number of pages34
Issue number2
StatePublished - Mar 2001

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics


  • Bargaining
  • The Coase conjecture
  • The hold-up problem
  • Unobservable investment


Dive into the research topics of 'Unobservable investment and the hold-up problem'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this