Uniform selection in global games

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3 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper brings together results which are required in order to extend the global games approach to settings where the game structure is endogenous. More precisely, it shows that the selection argument of Carlsson and van Damme [Global games and equilibrium selection, Econometrica 61(5) (1993) 989-1018] holds uniformly over appropriately controlled families of games. Those results also give proper justification for the inversion of limits which is often implicit in applied work taking comparative statics on the selected risk-dominant equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)222-241
Number of pages20
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume139
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2008

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Keywords

  • Comparative statics
  • Endogenous games
  • Equilibrium selection
  • Global games
  • Uniform selection

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