TY - GEN
T1 - Unconditionally Safe Light Client
AU - Moshrefi, Niusha
AU - Sheng, Peiyao
AU - Deb, Soubhik
AU - Kannan, Sreeram
AU - Viswanath, Pramod
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2026.
PY - 2026
Y1 - 2026
N2 - Blockchain applications often rely on lightweight clients to access and verify on-chain data efficiently without the need to run a resource-intensive full node. These light clients must maintain robust security to protect the blockchain’s integrity for users of applications built upon it, achieving this with minimal resources. Moreover, different applications have varying security needs. This work focuses on addressing these two key requirements and identifying the fundamental cost-latency trade-offs to achieve tailored, optimal security for light clients. Staking can provide economic guarantees (like in Proof-of-Stake blockchains). In this paper, we formalize this cryptoeconomic security to light clients, ensuring that the cost of corrupting the data provided to light clients must outweigh the potential profit, then, propose an economically secure light client protocol. We further introduce “insured” cryptoeconomic security to light clients, providing unconditional protection via the attribution of adversarial actions and the consequent slashing of stakes. Moreover, the divisible and fungible nature of stake facilitates programmable security, allowing for customization of the security level according to the specific needs of different applications. We implemented our light client in less than 1000 lines of Solidity and TypeScript code [49] and evaluated their gas cost, latency, and computational overhead. For example, for a transaction valued at $32k, the light client can choose between zero cost with a latency of 5 h, or instant confirmation with an insurance cost of $7.45. Thus, the client can select the optimal point on the latency-cost trade-off spectrum that best aligns with its needs. Our light client requires negligible storage and minimal computation, typically verifying only a few signatures (as few as one in most cases).
AB - Blockchain applications often rely on lightweight clients to access and verify on-chain data efficiently without the need to run a resource-intensive full node. These light clients must maintain robust security to protect the blockchain’s integrity for users of applications built upon it, achieving this with minimal resources. Moreover, different applications have varying security needs. This work focuses on addressing these two key requirements and identifying the fundamental cost-latency trade-offs to achieve tailored, optimal security for light clients. Staking can provide economic guarantees (like in Proof-of-Stake blockchains). In this paper, we formalize this cryptoeconomic security to light clients, ensuring that the cost of corrupting the data provided to light clients must outweigh the potential profit, then, propose an economically secure light client protocol. We further introduce “insured” cryptoeconomic security to light clients, providing unconditional protection via the attribution of adversarial actions and the consequent slashing of stakes. Moreover, the divisible and fungible nature of stake facilitates programmable security, allowing for customization of the security level according to the specific needs of different applications. We implemented our light client in less than 1000 lines of Solidity and TypeScript code [49] and evaluated their gas cost, latency, and computational overhead. For example, for a transaction valued at $32k, the light client can choose between zero cost with a latency of 5 h, or instant confirmation with an insurance cost of $7.45. Thus, the client can select the optimal point on the latency-cost trade-off spectrum that best aligns with its needs. Our light client requires negligible storage and minimal computation, typically verifying only a few signatures (as few as one in most cases).
KW - Blockchain
KW - Economic security
KW - Ethereum
KW - Light client
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105017370408
UR - https://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=105017370408&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-032-06176-8_1
DO - 10.1007/978-3-032-06176-8_1
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:105017370408
SN - 9783032061751
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science
SP - 1
EP - 29
BT - Blockchain – ICBC 2025 - 8th International Conference, Held as Part of the Services Conference Federation, SCF 2025, Proceedings
A2 - Shyamasundar, Rudrapatna K.
A2 - Huang, Huawei
A2 - He, Songlin
A2 - Fang, Junbin
A2 - Zhang, Liang-Jie
PB - Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
T2 - 8th International Conference on Blockchain, ICBC 2025, held as part of the Services Conference Federation, SCF 2025
Y2 - 27 September 2025 through 30 September 2025
ER -