Truthful mobile crowd sensing with interdependent valuations

Meng Zhang, Brian Swenson, Jianwei Huang, H. Vincent Poor

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Mobile crowd sensing (MCS) has been used to enable a wide range of resource-discovery applications by exploiting the "wisdom"of many mobile users. However, in many applications, a user's valuation depends on other users' sensory data, which introduces the problem of interdependent valuations. This feature can encourage sensory data misreport, hence makes economic mechanisms challenging. While some work has been done to address this problem, the issues of private utility information and communication overheads remain unsolved. In this study, we formulate the first interdependent-valuation model for the resource-discovery MCS systems, aiming to elicit truthful sensory reports and utility information and to maximize expected social welfare. We design a Truthful Sense-And-Bid (T-SAB) Mechanism based on surrogate functions, which can reveal marginal utility information by only requiring each user to submit one-dimensional signaling per resource. We show that the surrogate function and a reward function can limit users' willingness to misreport, when users have small informational sizes, a reasonable condition in large-scale MCS systems. Consequently, our T-SAB Mechanism yields a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) with the efficient allocation outcome, approximate truthfulness, individual rationality, and approximate budget balance. To illustrate the effectiveness of the T-SAB Mechanism, we perform a case study of a cognitive radio network. We demonstrate that the social welfare gain of the T-SAB Mechanism can achieve up to 20% social welfare gain comparing with a benchmark.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationMobiHoc 2020 - Proceedings of the 2020 International Symposium on Theory, Algorithmic Foundations, and Protocol Design for Mobile Networks and Mobile Computing
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
Pages91-100
Number of pages10
ISBN (Electronic)9781450380157
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 11 2020
Event21st ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing, MobiHoc 2020 - Virtual, Online, United States
Duration: Oct 11 2020Oct 14 2020

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc)

Conference

Conference21st ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing, MobiHoc 2020
CountryUnited States
CityVirtual, Online
Period10/11/2010/14/20

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Hardware and Architecture
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Software

Keywords

  • game theory
  • interdependent valuations
  • mechanism design
  • mobile crowd sensing

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