Abstract
We develop a model to compare the governance of traditional shareholder-owned platforms to that of platforms that issue tokens. A traditional shareholder governance structure leads a platform to extract rents from its users. A platform that issues tokens for its services can mitigate this rent extraction, as rent extraction lowers the platform owners’ token seigniorage revenues. However, this mitigation from issuing “service tokens” is effective only if the platform can commit itself not to dilute the “service token” subsequently. Issuing “hybrid tokens” that bundle claims on the platform's services and its profits enhances efficiency even absent ex-ante commitment power. Finally, giving users the right to vote on platform policies, by contrast, redistributes surplus but does not necessarily enhance efficiency.
Original language | English (US) |
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Article number | 103951 |
Journal | Journal of Financial Economics |
Volume | 162 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Dec 2024 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Accounting
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
- Strategy and Management
Keywords
- Corporate governance
- DeFi
- Platforms
- Utility tokens