Three conditions on conceptual naturalness

Daniel N. Osherson

doi:10.1016/0010-0277(78)90001-X

Three conditions on conceptual naturalness

Daniel N. Osherson

Psychology

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19 Scopus citations

Abstract

Human infants are predisposed to organize their experience in terms of certain concepts and not in terms of others. The favored concepts are called natural, the remainder, unnatural. A major problem in psychology is to state a principled distinction between the two kinds of concepts. Toward this end, the present paper offers three, formal necessary conditions on the naturalness of concepts. The conditions attempt to link the problem of naturalness to the distinctions between sense versus nonsense, simplicity versus complexity, and validity versus invalidity.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	263-289
Number of pages	27
Journal	Cognition
Volume	6
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(78)90001-X
State	Published - 1978

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Language and Linguistics
Developmental and Educational Psychology
Linguistics and Language
Cognitive Neuroscience

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10.1016/0010-0277(78)90001-X

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Three conditions on conceptual naturalness

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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