Thought Experiments as Tools of Theory ClarifcationGrace Helton

It is widely presumed that intuitions about thought experiments can help overturn philosophical theories. It isalso widely presumed, albeit implicitly, that if thought experiments play any epistemic role in overturning philosophical theories, it is via intuition. In this chapter, I argue for a different, neglected epistemic role of philosophical thought experiments, that of improving some reasoners appreciation both of what a theorys predictions consist of and of how those predictions tie to elements of the theory. I call this role theory clarification. I show that theory clarification does not proceed via intuition, and I argue that it is only in conjunction with theory clarification that intuitions about thought experiments can help overturn philosophical theories. I close by sketching how a more radical view might be true, on which thought experiments help justify the rejection of philosophical theories exclusively by clarifying theories, not by any intuitions those thought experiments might generate.