TY - JOUR
T1 - The value of information in the court
T2 - Get it right, keep it tight
AU - Iaryczower, Matias
AU - Shum, Matthew
PY - 2012/2
Y1 - 2012/2
N2 - We estimate an equilibrium model of decision making in the US Supreme Court that takes into account both private information and ideological differences between justices. We measure the value of information in the court by the probability that a justice votes differently from how she would have voted without case-specific information. Our results suggest a sizable value of information: in 44 percent of cases, justices' initial leanings are changed by their personal assessments of the case. Our results also confirm the increased politicization of the Supreme Court in the last quarter century. Counterfactual simulations provide implications for institutional design.
AB - We estimate an equilibrium model of decision making in the US Supreme Court that takes into account both private information and ideological differences between justices. We measure the value of information in the court by the probability that a justice votes differently from how she would have voted without case-specific information. Our results suggest a sizable value of information: in 44 percent of cases, justices' initial leanings are changed by their personal assessments of the case. Our results also confirm the increased politicization of the Supreme Court in the last quarter century. Counterfactual simulations provide implications for institutional design.
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U2 - 10.1257/aer.102.1.202
DO - 10.1257/aer.102.1.202
M3 - Review article
AN - SCOPUS:84856845221
SN - 0002-8282
VL - 102
SP - 202
EP - 237
JO - American Economic Review
JF - American Economic Review
IS - 1
ER -