Abstract
This paper examines the role of other-regarding behavior as a mechanism for the establishment and maintenance of cooperation in resource use under variable social and environmental conditions. By coupling resource stock dynamics with social dynamics concerning compliance to a social norm prescribing non-excessive resource extraction in a common pool resource, we show that when reputational considerations matter and a sufficient level of social stigma affects the violators of a norm, sustainable outcomes are achieved. We find large parameter regions where norm-observing and norm-violating types coexist, and analyze to what extent such coexistence depends on the environment.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 152-161 |
Number of pages | 10 |
Journal | Journal of Theoretical Biology |
Volume | 299 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Apr 21 2012 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- General Immunology and Microbiology
- Applied Mathematics
- General Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology
- General Agricultural and Biological Sciences
- Statistics and Probability
- Modeling and Simulation
Keywords
- Common pool resource
- Cooperation
- Evolutionary game theory
- Ostracism
- Social norm