The Role of Arbitration Costs and Risk Aversion in Dispute Outcomes

HENRY S. FARBER, MARGARET A. NEALE, MAX H. BAZERMAN

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

8 Scopus citations

Abstract

The effects of risk aversion and of arbitration costs on bargaining outcomes are investigated using data from 171 simulated negotiations. The results are generally consistent with predictions from a simple economic bargaining model. We find strong evidence that directs costs of arbitration lead to higher rates of agreement. There is only weak evidence the risk aversion is related to the probability of agreement, but negotiated settlements seems to favor the less risk‐averse bargainer.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)361-384
Number of pages24
JournalIndustrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society
Volume29
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1990

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Industrial relations
  • Strategy and Management
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
  • Management of Technology and Innovation

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