The robustness of robust implementation

Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, Stephen Morris

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

8 Scopus citations


We show that a mechanism that robustly implements optimal outcomes in a one-dimensional supermodular environment continues to robustly implement ε-optimal outcomes in all close-by environments. Robust implementation of ε-optimal outcomes is thus robust to small perturbations of the environment. This is in contrast to ex-post implementation which is not robust in this sense as only trivial social choice functions are ex-post implementable in generic environments.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)2093-2104
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number5
StatePublished - Sep 2011

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics


  • Belief-dependent outcomes
  • Ex-post implementation
  • Robust implementation
  • Social choice correspondence


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