TY - JOUR
T1 - The robustness of robust implementation
AU - Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz
AU - Morris, Stephen
N1 - Funding Information:
✩ This research is supported by NSF grant SES-0850718. We would like to thank the associate editor at JET and three anonymous referees for their thoughtful advice that improved the exposition of this note, and seminar audiences at ASSA 2010, the Princeton Conference on Mechanism Design, Toronto, and UCLA for helpful comments. * Corresponding author. Fax: +1 310 825 9528. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (M. Meyer-ter-Vehn), [email protected] (S. Morris). URLs: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/people/Faculty/Meyer-ter-vehn.html (M. Meyer-ter-Vehn), http://www.princeton.edu/~smorris (S. Morris).
PY - 2011/9
Y1 - 2011/9
N2 - We show that a mechanism that robustly implements optimal outcomes in a one-dimensional supermodular environment continues to robustly implement ε-optimal outcomes in all close-by environments. Robust implementation of ε-optimal outcomes is thus robust to small perturbations of the environment. This is in contrast to ex-post implementation which is not robust in this sense as only trivial social choice functions are ex-post implementable in generic environments.
AB - We show that a mechanism that robustly implements optimal outcomes in a one-dimensional supermodular environment continues to robustly implement ε-optimal outcomes in all close-by environments. Robust implementation of ε-optimal outcomes is thus robust to small perturbations of the environment. This is in contrast to ex-post implementation which is not robust in this sense as only trivial social choice functions are ex-post implementable in generic environments.
KW - Belief-dependent outcomes
KW - Ex-post implementation
KW - Robust implementation
KW - Social choice correspondence
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.011
DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.011
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:80052384472
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 146
SP - 2093
EP - 2104
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 5
ER -