TY - JOUR
T1 - The returns to office in a rubber stamp parliament
AU - Truex, Rory
N1 - Funding Information:
This material is based upon work completed in Yale’s doctoral program in political science and supported by the National Science Foundation’s Graduate Research Fellowship Program (GRFP). Additional financial support was provided by Yale University’s MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies and Leitner Program in Political Economy. Thanks to Peter Aronow, Stephanie Balme, Allison Carnegie, Thad Dunning, Jennifer Gandhi, Jamie Horsely, Scott Kennedy, Peter Lorentzen, Pierre Landry, Xiaobo Lu, Eddy Malesky, Emerson Niou, Kevin O’Brien, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Ken Scheve, Dawn Teele, Lily Tsai, Jeremy Wallace, Michael Weaver, Jessica Weiss, and participants at conferences and presentations at UC Berkeley, Duke, Emory, NYU, Princeton, Stanford, and Yale for helpful comments at various stages in the project. Any remaining errors are my own. Replication files are available on the author’s personal website: http://pantheon.yale.edu/~rot3/ .
PY - 2014/5
Y1 - 2014/5
N2 - Are there returns to office in an authoritarian parliament? A new dataset shows that over 500 deputies to China's National People's Congress are CEOs of various companies. Entropy balancing is used to construct a weighted portfolio of Chinese companies that matches companies with NPC representation on relevant financial characteristics prior to the 11th Congress (2008-2012). The weighted fixed effect analysis suggests that a seat in the NPC is worth an additional 1.5 percentage points in returns and a 3 to 4 percentage point boost in operating profit margin in a given year. Additional evidence reveals that these rents stem primarily from the reputation boost of the position, and not necessarily formal policy influence. These findings confirm the assumptions of several prominent theories of authoritarian politics but suggest the need to further probe the nature of these institutions.
AB - Are there returns to office in an authoritarian parliament? A new dataset shows that over 500 deputies to China's National People's Congress are CEOs of various companies. Entropy balancing is used to construct a weighted portfolio of Chinese companies that matches companies with NPC representation on relevant financial characteristics prior to the 11th Congress (2008-2012). The weighted fixed effect analysis suggests that a seat in the NPC is worth an additional 1.5 percentage points in returns and a 3 to 4 percentage point boost in operating profit margin in a given year. Additional evidence reveals that these rents stem primarily from the reputation boost of the position, and not necessarily formal policy influence. These findings confirm the assumptions of several prominent theories of authoritarian politics but suggest the need to further probe the nature of these institutions.
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U2 - 10.1017/S0003055414000112
DO - 10.1017/S0003055414000112
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84902388501
SN - 0003-0554
VL - 108
SP - 235
EP - 251
JO - American Political Science Review
JF - American Political Science Review
IS - 2
ER -