The Presidential Veto

This article outlines what political scientists have, and have not, learned about the use of vetoes, the effects of vetoes, and the significance of the veto power. It starts by summarizing the micro-politics of the veto. It then turns to the macro-politics of the veto. It specifically points out the knotty problems that plague macro-political studies: the 'wheat from the chaff' problem, the 'small-n' problem and the 'no institutional variation' problem. Some new points of departure are provided. The article points to the possibility of theoretically modeling, and empirically studying, integrated presidential strategy, including the veto. The themes in Cameron 2006 are elaborated. Models of integrated presidential strategy knitting together veto power, proposal power, and strategic pre-action would establish a new vision of presidential governance, a vision reflecting the rise of the modern administrative state, polarized politics, the plebiscitary presidency, and the continuing reality of interbranch bargaining.