TY - JOUR
T1 - The political economy of public sector absence
AU - Callen, Michael
AU - Gulzar, Saad
AU - Hasanain, Ali
AU - Khan, Muhammad Yasir
AU - Rezaee, Arman
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 The Author(s)
PY - 2023/2
Y1 - 2023/2
N2 - The paper examines how politics relates to public sector absenteeism, a chronic and intractable public service delivery problem in many developing countries. In Punjab, Pakistan, we document that political interference routinely protects doctors from bureaucratic sanction, while personal connections between doctors and politicians and a lack of political competition are associated with more doctor absence. We then examine how politics impacts the success of an at-scale policy reform to combat absenteeism. We find that the reform was more effective at increasing doctor attendance in politically competitive constituencies, both through increased monitoring and through senior health officials being able to respond more effectively to the data gathered on poor performing clinics. Our results demonstrate that politics can block the success of reform; instead of lifting poor performers up, the reform only improved places that had already been performing better. The evidence collectively points to the fundamental importance of accounting for political incentives in policy design and implementation.
AB - The paper examines how politics relates to public sector absenteeism, a chronic and intractable public service delivery problem in many developing countries. In Punjab, Pakistan, we document that political interference routinely protects doctors from bureaucratic sanction, while personal connections between doctors and politicians and a lack of political competition are associated with more doctor absence. We then examine how politics impacts the success of an at-scale policy reform to combat absenteeism. We find that the reform was more effective at increasing doctor attendance in politically competitive constituencies, both through increased monitoring and through senior health officials being able to respond more effectively to the data gathered on poor performing clinics. Our results demonstrate that politics can block the success of reform; instead of lifting poor performers up, the reform only improved places that had already been performing better. The evidence collectively points to the fundamental importance of accounting for political incentives in policy design and implementation.
KW - Absenteeism
KW - Health sector reforms
KW - Information Communication Technology
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85145824213&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104787
DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104787
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85145824213
SN - 0047-2727
VL - 218
JO - Journal of Public Economics
JF - Journal of Public Economics
M1 - 104787
ER -