The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: A defense

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19 Scopus citations


It is shown that the Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering appears as a very natural solution to the problem of defining social preferences over distributions of divisible goods. The paper analyses various ways of deriving this social ordering from minimally egalitarian conditions and informational parsimony requirements.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)145-166
Number of pages22
JournalReview of Economic Design
Issue number2
StatePublished - Apr 1 2005
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)


  • Egalitarian-equivalence
  • Fairness
  • Social choice
  • Social welfare


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