The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: A defense

Marc Fleurbaey

doi:10.1007/s10058-005-0124-z

The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: A defense

Marc Fleurbaey

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

20 Scopus citations

Abstract

It is shown that the Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering appears as a very natural solution to the problem of defining social preferences over distributions of divisible goods. The paper analyses various ways of deriving this social ordering from minimally egalitarian conditions and informational parsimony requirements.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	145-166
Number of pages	22
Journal	Review of Economic Design
Volume	9
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-005-0124-z
State	Published - Apr 2005
Externally published	Yes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

General Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Keywords

Egalitarian-equivalence
Fairness
Social choice
Social welfare

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10.1007/s10058-005-0124-z

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abstract = "It is shown that the Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering appears as a very natural solution to the problem of defining social preferences over distributions of divisible goods. The paper analyses various ways of deriving this social ordering from minimally egalitarian conditions and informational parsimony requirements.",

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KW - Fairness

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KW - Social welfare

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The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: A defense

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Keywords

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