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The optimal design of international trade institutions: Uncertainty and escape
B. Peter Rosendorff
,
Helen V. Milner
Research output
:
Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
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Chapter
3
Scopus citations
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Dive into the research topics of 'The optimal design of international trade institutions: Uncertainty and escape'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.
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Keyphrases
Centralized Control
33%
Decision-making Mechanism
33%
Design of International Institutions
33%
Design Project
33%
Escape Clause
100%
Institutional Design
100%
International Institutions
33%
International Trade
100%
International Trade Agreements
100%
Number of States
33%
Politicians
33%
Rational Design
33%
Rational Responses
33%
Safeguard Clause
33%
Self-interested Behavior
33%
State-making
33%
Trade Institutions
100%
Social Sciences
Decision Making
33%
International Trade
100%
International Trade Agreement
100%
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
International Trade Agreement
100%