Abstract
Conventional wisdom holds that pure moral principles hold of metaphysical necessity, from which it follows that it is metaphysically impossible for the moral facts to vary independently of the descriptive facts. Moral contingentists deny this, holding that the moral laws are in some cases like the laws of nature: metaphysically contingent, but necessary in a weaker sense. The present chapter makes a preliminary case for moral contingentism and defends the view against recent objections due to Lange (2018) and Dreier (2019).
Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | Oxford Studies in Metaethics |
Subtitle of host publication | Volume 16 |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 257-279 |
Number of pages | 23 |
Volume | 16 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780192897466 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 1 2021 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- General Arts and Humanities
Keywords
- Essence
- James Dreier
- Laws of nature
- Marc Lange
- Metaethics
- Modality
- Moral contingentism
- Moral luck
- Supervenience