The Modal Status of Moral Principles

Gideon Rosen

doi:10.1093/oso/9780192897466.003.0011

The Modal Status of Moral Principles

Gideon Rosen

Philosophy

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

Conventional wisdom holds that pure moral principles hold of metaphysical necessity, from which it follows that it is metaphysically impossible for the moral facts to vary independently of the descriptive facts. Moral contingentists deny this, holding that the moral laws are in some cases like the laws of nature: metaphysically contingent, but necessary in a weaker sense. The present chapter makes a preliminary case for moral contingentism and defends the view against recent objections due to Lange (2018) and Dreier (2019).

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Oxford Studies in Metaethics
Subtitle of host publication	Volume 16
Publisher	Oxford University Press
Pages	257-279
Number of pages	23
Volume	16
ISBN (Electronic)	9780192897466
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192897466.003.0011
State	Published - Jan 1 2021

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

General Arts and Humanities

Keywords

Essence
James Dreier
Laws of nature
Marc Lange
Metaethics
Modality
Moral contingentism
Moral luck
Supervenience

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10.1093/oso/9780192897466.003.0011

Cite this

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KW - Metaethics

KW - Modality

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KW - Moral luck

KW - Supervenience

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The Modal Status of Moral Principles

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Keywords

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