The Modal Status of Moral Principles

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

Conventional wisdom holds that pure moral principles hold of metaphysical necessity, from which it follows that it is metaphysically impossible for the moral facts to vary independently of the descriptive facts. Moral contingentists deny this, holding that the moral laws are in some cases like the laws of nature: metaphysically contingent, but necessary in a weaker sense. The present chapter makes a preliminary case for moral contingentism and defends the view against recent objections due to Lange (2018) and Dreier (2019).

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationOxford Studies in Metaethics
Subtitle of host publicationVolume 16
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages257-279
Number of pages23
Volume16
ISBN (Electronic)9780192897466
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2021

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • General Arts and Humanities

Keywords

  • Essence
  • James Dreier
  • Laws of nature
  • Marc Lange
  • Metaethics
  • Modality
  • Moral contingentism
  • Moral luck
  • Supervenience

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