Abstract
This chapter argues that some of the traditional arguments for expressivism in metaethics carry over to the case of gender ascriptions. Descriptivist views about the semantics of gender ascriptions fall short in explaining certain kinds of disagreement in ways that are similar to the ways in which descriptivist views about normative terms fall short. This suggests an argument for expressivism about gender ascriptions. to The chapter explores the idea that if gender ascriptions are normative, we might understand gender terms on the model of ethically thick terms. One way of avoiding the conclusion that gender ascriptions are expressive and/or normative is to argue that the relevant kinds of disagreement are instances of metalinguistic negotiation. After presenting some concerns associated with this explanation, the chapter closes with a discussion of some of the reasons for thinking that the realist might get back in the game.
Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | Oxford Studies in Metaethics |
Subtitle of host publication | Volume 16 |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 27-53 |
Number of pages | 27 |
Volume | 16 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780192897466 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 1 2021 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- General Arts and Humanities
Keywords
- Expressivism
- Gender
- Metalinguistic negotiation
- Moral disagreement
- Thick terms