The Ineffability of Induction

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Abstract

My first goal is to motivate a distinctively metaphysical approach to the problem of induction. I argue that there is a precise sense in which the only way that orthodox Humean and non-Humean views can justify induction is by appealing to extremely strong and unmotivated probabilistic biases. My second goal is to sketch what such a metaphysical approach could possibly look like. After sketching such an approach, I consider a toy case that illustrates the way in which such a metaphysics can help us make progress on the problem of induction.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)129-149
Number of pages21
JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume104
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2022
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy
  • History and Philosophy of Science

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