The gas centrifuge and the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons

R. Scott Kemp, Alexander Glaser

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

The gas centrifuge is a particularly challenging technology for the institutions of the existing nonproliferation regime. Centrifuge facilities can be reconfigured for the production of weapon-grade uranium in a comparatively short time-frame, while clandestine facilities are virtually impossible to detect with technical intelligence tools. A potential expansion in nuclear power and the natural maturing of states' technical abilities suggest a world where centrifuge proliferation could become an even more serious threat to global security. This overview reviews the proliferation-relevant technical characteristics of the gas centrifuge and examines how effective control strategies must differ from traditional approaches. A well-informed policymaking process is needed to address these issues. We outline current gaps in understanding that ought to be closed in order to formulate robust nonproliferation policies.

Original languageEnglish (US)
StatePublished - Jan 1 2006
Event9th International Workshop on Separation Phenomena in Liquids and Gases, SPLG 2006 - Beijing, China
Duration: Sep 18 2006Sep 21 2006

Conference

Conference9th International Workshop on Separation Phenomena in Liquids and Gases, SPLG 2006
CountryChina
CityBeijing
Period9/18/069/21/06

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Filtration and Separation
  • Fluid Flow and Transfer Processes
  • Process Chemistry and Technology

Keywords

  • Detection
  • Expansion
  • Nonproliferation
  • Nuclear Power
  • Safeguards

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