Abstract
The gas centrifuge is a particularly challenging technology for the institutions of the existing nonproliferation regime. Centrifuge facilities can be reconfigured for the production of weapon-grade uranium in a comparatively short time-frame, while clandestine facilities are virtually impossible to detect with technical intelligence tools. A potential expansion in nuclear power and the natural maturing of states' technical abilities suggest a world where centrifuge proliferation could become an even more serious threat to global security. This overview reviews the proliferation-relevant technical characteristics of the gas centrifuge and examines how effective control strategies must differ from traditional approaches. A well-informed policymaking process is needed to address these issues. We outline current gaps in understanding that ought to be closed in order to formulate robust nonproliferation policies.
Original language | English (US) |
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State | Published - 2006 |
Event | 9th International Workshop on Separation Phenomena in Liquids and Gases, SPLG 2006 - Beijing, China Duration: Sep 18 2006 → Sep 21 2006 |
Conference
Conference | 9th International Workshop on Separation Phenomena in Liquids and Gases, SPLG 2006 |
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Country/Territory | China |
City | Beijing |
Period | 9/18/06 → 9/21/06 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Filtration and Separation
- Fluid Flow and Transfer Processes
- Process Chemistry and Technology
Keywords
- Detection
- Expansion
- Nonproliferation
- Nuclear Power
- Safeguards