TY - JOUR
T1 - The costs of favoritism
T2 - Is politically driven aid less effective?
AU - Dreher, Axel
AU - Klasen, Stephan
AU - Vreeland, James Raymond
AU - Werker, Eric
N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2019 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2013/10
Y1 - 2013/10
N2 - The bureaucratic agents, for their part, may desire to implement effective programs irrespective of the political motivations of donors. Politically motivated aid might, however, fall short in delivering development benefits. First, politically motivated aid allocation may lead to the approval of lower-quality projects to favored countries, compared with competing projects from other countries. Second, politically motivated projects may face less intense supervision by the World Bank or the recipient country to achieve success on development outcomes, particularly if more intense supervision might lead to reduced or delayed resource transfers. Moreover, the granting of a project may delay important policy reforms that could, among other things, also promote project success. The direct connection of this measure to each specific project represents its key advantage over broader and noisier measures, such as economic growth, a variable influenced by many factors beyond World Bank support. Some readers might worry that World Bank evaluations may be biased.
AB - The bureaucratic agents, for their part, may desire to implement effective programs irrespective of the political motivations of donors. Politically motivated aid might, however, fall short in delivering development benefits. First, politically motivated aid allocation may lead to the approval of lower-quality projects to favored countries, compared with competing projects from other countries. Second, politically motivated projects may face less intense supervision by the World Bank or the recipient country to achieve success on development outcomes, particularly if more intense supervision might lead to reduced or delayed resource transfers. Moreover, the granting of a project may delay important policy reforms that could, among other things, also promote project success. The direct connection of this measure to each specific project represents its key advantage over broader and noisier measures, such as economic growth, a variable influenced by many factors beyond World Bank support. Some readers might worry that World Bank evaluations may be biased.
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U2 - 10.1086/671711
DO - 10.1086/671711
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84883821438
VL - 62
SP - 157
EP - 191
JO - Economic Development and Cultural Change
JF - Economic Development and Cultural Change
SN - 0013-0079
IS - 1
ER -