Abstract
In a recent article in this journal, Smith and Stam (2004) call into question the usefulness and applicability of what is know as the common priors assumption in the modeling of countries' strategic behavior in international relations. While the authors of this comment acknowledge that it is possible to incorporate noncommon priors in models of politics in a mathematically consistent fashion, they do not agree with the article's claims regarding the limitations of the common priors approach, which motivate Smith and Stam's rejection of it.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 607-613 |
Number of pages | 7 |
Journal | Journal of Conflict Resolution |
Volume | 50 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Aug 2006 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- General Business, Management and Accounting
- Sociology and Political Science
- Political Science and International Relations
Keywords
- Bargaining
- Common priors
- War