Abstract
We combine survey data on friendship networks and individual characteristics with experimental observations from dictator games. Dictator offers are primarily explained by social distance, giving follows a simple inverse distance law. While student demographics play a minor role in explaining offer amounts, individual heterogeneity is important for network formation. In particular, we detect significant homophilous behavior; students connect to others similar to themselves. Moreover, the network data reveal a strong preference for cliques, students connect to those already close. The study is one of the first to identify network architecture with individual behavior in a strategic context.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 183-203 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Journal | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |
| Volume | 2 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Feb 1 2010 |
| Externally published | Yes |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- General Economics, Econometrics and Finance