Abstract
We propose a new mean-field game model with two states to study synchronization phenomena, and we provide a comprehensive characterization of stationary and dynamic equilibria along with their stability properties. The game undergoes a phase transition with increasing interaction strength. In the subcritical regime, the uniform distribution, representing incoherence, is the unique and stable stationary equilibrium. Above the critical interaction threshold, the uniform equilibrium becomes unstable and there is a multiplicity of stationary equilibria that are self-organizing. Under a discounted cost, dynamic equilibria spiral around the uniform distribution before converging to the self-organizing equilibria. With an ergodic cost, however, unexpected periodic equilibria around the uniform distribution emerge.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1443-1462 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| Journal | Mathematics of Operations Research |
| Volume | 51 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - May 2026 |
| Externally published | Yes |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- General Mathematics
- Computer Science Applications
- Management Science and Operations Research
Keywords
- consensus problems
- dynamic programming
- Kuramoto synchronization
- mean-field games
- Nash equilibrium
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