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Synchronization Games

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We propose a new mean-field game model with two states to study synchronization phenomena, and we provide a comprehensive characterization of stationary and dynamic equilibria along with their stability properties. The game undergoes a phase transition with increasing interaction strength. In the subcritical regime, the uniform distribution, representing incoherence, is the unique and stable stationary equilibrium. Above the critical interaction threshold, the uniform equilibrium becomes unstable and there is a multiplicity of stationary equilibria that are self-organizing. Under a discounted cost, dynamic equilibria spiral around the uniform distribution before converging to the self-organizing equilibria. With an ergodic cost, however, unexpected periodic equilibria around the uniform distribution emerge.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1443-1462
Number of pages20
JournalMathematics of Operations Research
Volume51
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2026
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • General Mathematics
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Management Science and Operations Research

Keywords

  • consensus problems
  • dynamic programming
  • Kuramoto synchronization
  • mean-field games
  • Nash equilibrium

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