Abstract
Many have claimed that unspecific evidence sometimes demands unsharp, indeterminate, imprecise, vague, or interval-valued probabilities. Against this, a variant of the diachronic Dutch Book argument shows that perfectly rational agents always have perfectly sharp probabilities.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1-11 |
| Number of pages | 11 |
| Journal | Philosophers Imprint |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| State | Published - May 2010 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Philosophy
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