Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition

Dilip Abreu; Arunava Sen

doi:10.1016/0022-0531(90)90003-3

Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition

Dilip Abreu
, Arunava Sen

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

97 Scopus citations

Abstract

We present a necessary and almost sufficient condition for subgame perfect implementation of social choice correspondences. In societies with at least three individuals, any social choice correspondence which satisfies no veto power and our necessary Condition α is subgame perfect implementable. Thus Condition α is analogous to monotonicity which, by Maskin's celebrated characterization, is necessary and, in a similar way, almost sufficient for Nash implementation.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	285-299
Number of pages	15
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	50
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90003-3
State	Published - Apr 1990

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/0022-0531(90)90003-3

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AB - We present a necessary and almost sufficient condition for subgame perfect implementation of social choice correspondences. In societies with at least three individuals, any social choice correspondence which satisfies no veto power and our necessary Condition α is subgame perfect implementable. Thus Condition α is analogous to monotonicity which, by Maskin's celebrated characterization, is necessary and, in a similar way, almost sufficient for Nash implementation.

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Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition

Abstract

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