TY - JOUR
T1 - Subgame perfect implementation
T2 - A necessary and almost sufficient condition
AU - Abreu, Dilip
AU - Sen, Arunava
PY - 1990/4
Y1 - 1990/4
N2 - We present a necessary and almost sufficient condition for subgame perfect implementation of social choice correspondences. In societies with at least three individuals, any social choice correspondence which satisfies no veto power and our necessary Condition α is subgame perfect implementable. Thus Condition α is analogous to monotonicity which, by Maskin's celebrated characterization, is necessary and, in a similar way, almost sufficient for Nash implementation.
AB - We present a necessary and almost sufficient condition for subgame perfect implementation of social choice correspondences. In societies with at least three individuals, any social choice correspondence which satisfies no veto power and our necessary Condition α is subgame perfect implementable. Thus Condition α is analogous to monotonicity which, by Maskin's celebrated characterization, is necessary and, in a similar way, almost sufficient for Nash implementation.
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U2 - 10.1016/0022-0531(90)90003-3
DO - 10.1016/0022-0531(90)90003-3
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0000119541
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 50
SP - 285
EP - 299
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 2
ER -