Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition

Dilip Abreu, Arunava Sen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

89 Scopus citations

Abstract

We present a necessary and almost sufficient condition for subgame perfect implementation of social choice correspondences. In societies with at least three individuals, any social choice correspondence which satisfies no veto power and our necessary Condition α is subgame perfect implementable. Thus Condition α is analogous to monotonicity which, by Maskin's celebrated characterization, is necessary and, in a similar way, almost sufficient for Nash implementation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)285-299
Number of pages15
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume50
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1990

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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