TY - JOUR
T1 - Strategic redistricting
AU - Gul, Faruk
AU - Pesendorfer, Wolfgang
N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2010 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2010/9
Y1 - 2010/9
N2 - Two parties choose redistricting plans to maximize their probability of winning a majority in the House of Representatives. In the unique equilibrium, parties maximally segregate their opponents" supporters but pool their own supporters into uniform districts. Ceteris paribus, the stronger party segregates more than the weaker one, and the election outcome is biased in the stronger party"s favor and against the party whose supporters are easier to identify. We incorporate policy choice into our redistricting game and find that when one party controls redistricting, the equilibrium policy is biased towards the preferences of the redistricting party"s supporters.
AB - Two parties choose redistricting plans to maximize their probability of winning a majority in the House of Representatives. In the unique equilibrium, parties maximally segregate their opponents" supporters but pool their own supporters into uniform districts. Ceteris paribus, the stronger party segregates more than the weaker one, and the election outcome is biased in the stronger party"s favor and against the party whose supporters are easier to identify. We incorporate policy choice into our redistricting game and find that when one party controls redistricting, the equilibrium policy is biased towards the preferences of the redistricting party"s supporters.
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U2 - 10.1257/aer.100.4.1616
DO - 10.1257/aer.100.4.1616
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:77956947716
VL - 100
SP - 1616
EP - 1641
JO - American Economic Review
JF - American Economic Review
SN - 0002-8282
IS - 4
ER -