Strategic redistricting

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

17 Scopus citations

Abstract

Two parties choose redistricting plans to maximize their probability of winning a majority in the House of Representatives. In the unique equilibrium, parties maximally segregate their opponents" supporters but pool their own supporters into uniform districts. Ceteris paribus, the stronger party segregates more than the weaker one, and the election outcome is biased in the stronger party"s favor and against the party whose supporters are easier to identify. We incorporate policy choice into our redistricting game and find that when one party controls redistricting, the equilibrium policy is biased towards the preferences of the redistricting party"s supporters.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1616-1641
Number of pages26
JournalAmerican Economic Review
Volume100
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2010

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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