Abstract
Many economists and philosophers assume that status quo bias is necessarily irrational. I argue that, in some cases, status quo bias is fully rational. I discuss the rationality of status quo bias on both subjective and objective theories of the rationality of preferences. I argue that subjective theories cannot plausibly condemn this bias as irrational. I then discuss one kind of objective theory, which holds that a conservative bias toward existing things of value is rational. This account can fruitfully explain some compelling aspects of common sense morality, and it may justify status quo bias.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 449-476 |
Number of pages | 28 |
Journal | Ethics |
Volume | 125 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 1 2015 |
Externally published | Yes |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Philosophy