Abstract
Motivated by the extensive evidence about the relevance of status quo bias both in experiments and in real markets, we study this phenomenon from a decision-theoretic prospective, focusing on the case of preferences under uncertainty. We develop an axiomatic framework that takes as a primitive the preferences of an agent for each possible status quo option, and provide a characterization according to which the agent considers a full-dimensional set of possible priors and abandons her status quo option only if she finds an alternative that returns a higher expected utility for each of these priors. We then show that, in this framework, the very presence of a status quo induces the agent to be more uncertainty averse than she would be without a status quo option.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 411-424 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Volume | 69 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jul 2010 |
| Externally published | Yes |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
Keywords
- Ambiguity aversion
- Endowment effect
- Status quo bias