Source-channel secrecy with causal disclosure

Curt Schieler, Eva C. Song, Paul Cuff, H. Vincent Poor

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

Imperfect secrecy in communication systems is investigated. Instead of using equivocation as a measure of secrecy, the distortion that an eavesdropper incurs in producing an estimate of the source sequence is examined. The communication system consists of a source and a broadcast (wiretap) channel, and lossless reproduction of the source sequence at the legitimate receiver is required. A key aspect of this model is that the eavesdropper's actions are allowed to depend on the past behavior of the system. Achievability results are obtained by studying the performance of source and channel coding operations separately, and then linking them together digitally. Although the problem addressed here has been solved when the secrecy resource is shared secret key, it is found that substituting secret key for a wiretap channel brings new insights and challenges: the notion of weak secrecy provides just as much distortion at the eavesdropper as strong secrecy, and revealing public messages freely is detrimental.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2012 50th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2012
Pages968-973
Number of pages6
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2012
Event2012 50th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2012 - Monticello, IL, United States
Duration: Oct 1 2012Oct 5 2012

Publication series

Name2012 50th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2012

Other

Other2012 50th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2012
CountryUnited States
CityMonticello, IL
Period10/1/1210/5/12

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Computer Science Applications

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  • Cite this

    Schieler, C., Song, E. C., Cuff, P., & Poor, H. V. (2012). Source-channel secrecy with causal disclosure. In 2012 50th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2012 (pp. 968-973). [6483323] (2012 50th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2012). https://doi.org/10.1109/Allerton.2012.6483323