We address two kinds of criticisms of our Bayesian framework for generalization: those that question the correctness or the coverage of our analysis, and those that question its intrinsic value. Speaking to the first set, we clarify the origins and scope of our size principle for weighting hypotheses or features, focusing on its potential status as a cognitive universal; outline several variants of our framework to address additional phenomena of generalization raised in the commentaries; and discuss the subtleties of our claims about the relationship between similarity and generalization. Speaking to the second set, we identify the unique contributions that a rational statistical approach to generalization offers over traditional models that focus on mental representation and cognitive processes.
|Original language||English (US)|
|Number of pages||30|
|Journal||Behavioral and Brain Sciences|
|State||Published - 2001|
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Neuropsychology and Physiological Psychology
- Behavioral Neuroscience