Some Content is Narrow

One way to defend narrow content is to produce a sentence of the form ‘S believes that P’, and show that this sentence is true of S if and only if it is true of any duplicate from the skin in, any doppelganger, of S. Notoriously, this is hard to do. Twin Earth examples are pervasive.’ Another way to defend narrow content is to show that only a narrow notion can play the causal explanatory role we require of content in a properly scientific psychology or cognitive science. Notoriously, this is hard to do. The considerations00ADmethodological solipsism, the principle of autonomy, or whatever00ADinvoked to show that a broad notion of content cannot play the required causal explanatory role are open to serious objection.2 More-over, this approach is not an argument for the existence of narrow content as such. It is an argument that content had better be narrow.