Social learning and collective choice

Daniel Osherson, M. Stob, S. Weinstein

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

To be pertinent to democratic practice, collective choice functions need not apply to all possible constellations of individual preference, but only to those that are "humanly possible" in an appropriate sense. The present paper develops a theory of humanly possible preference within the context of the mathematical theory of learning. The theory of preference is then exploited in an attempt to resolve Arrow's voting paradox through restriction of the domain of majoritarian choice functions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)319-347
Number of pages29
JournalSynthese
Volume70
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 1987

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy
  • Social Sciences(all)

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    Osherson, D., Stob, M., & Weinstein, S. (1987). Social learning and collective choice. Synthese, 70(3), 319-347. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00414154