Social learning and collective choice

D. N. Osherson, M. Stob, S. Weinstein

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


To be pertinent to democratic practice, collective choice functions need not apply to all possible constellations of individual preference, but only to those that are "humanly possible" in an appropriate sense. The present paper develops a theory of humanly possible preference within the context of the mathematical theory of learning. The theory of preference is then exploited in an attempt to resolve Arrow's voting paradox through restriction of the domain of majoritarian choice functions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)319-347
Number of pages29
Issue number3
StatePublished - Mar 1987

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy
  • General Social Sciences


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