Social creation of pro-social preferences for collective action

Avinash Dixit; Simon Asher Levin

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-49442-5_7

Social creation of pro-social preferences for collective action

Avinash Dixit, Simon Asher Levin

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter

13 Scopus citations

Abstract

Pro-social preferences are thought to play a significant role in solving society’s collective action problems of providing public goods and reducing public bads. Societies can benefit by deliberately instilling and sustaining such preferences in their members. We construct a theoretical model to examine an intergenerational education process for this. We consider both a one-time action of this kind and a constitution that establishes a steady state, and compare the two.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	The Theory of Externalities and Public Goods
Subtitle of host publication	Essays in Memory of Richard C. Cornes
Publisher	Springer International Publishing
Pages	127-143
Number of pages	17
ISBN (Electronic)	9783319494425
ISBN (Print)	9783319494418
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49442-5_7
State	Published - Jan 1 2017

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
General Business, Management and Accounting
General Mathematics

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-319-49442-5_7

Cite this

@inbook{b548a6a98b34441d9e9e4a689912f039,

title = "Social creation of pro-social preferences for collective action",

abstract = "Pro-social preferences are thought to play a significant role in solving society{\textquoteright}s collective action problems of providing public goods and reducing public bads. Societies can benefit by deliberately instilling and sustaining such preferences in their members. We construct a theoretical model to examine an intergenerational education process for this. We consider both a one-time action of this kind and a constitution that establishes a steady state, and compare the two.",

author = "Avinash Dixit and Levin, {Simon Asher}",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} Springer International Publishing AG 2017.",

year = "2017",

month = jan,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-49442-5_7",

language = "English (US)",

isbn = "9783319494418",

pages = "127--143",

booktitle = "The Theory of Externalities and Public Goods",

publisher = "Springer International Publishing",

}

TY - CHAP

T1 - Social creation of pro-social preferences for collective action

AU - Dixit, Avinash

AU - Levin, Simon Asher

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © Springer International Publishing AG 2017.

PY - 2017/1/1

Y1 - 2017/1/1

N2 - Pro-social preferences are thought to play a significant role in solving society’s collective action problems of providing public goods and reducing public bads. Societies can benefit by deliberately instilling and sustaining such preferences in their members. We construct a theoretical model to examine an intergenerational education process for this. We consider both a one-time action of this kind and a constitution that establishes a steady state, and compare the two.

AB - Pro-social preferences are thought to play a significant role in solving society’s collective action problems of providing public goods and reducing public bads. Societies can benefit by deliberately instilling and sustaining such preferences in their members. We construct a theoretical model to examine an intergenerational education process for this. We consider both a one-time action of this kind and a constitution that establishes a steady state, and compare the two.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85034211843&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85034211843&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-49442-5_7

DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-49442-5_7

M3 - Chapter

AN - SCOPUS:85034211843

SN - 9783319494418

SP - 127

EP - 143

BT - The Theory of Externalities and Public Goods

PB - Springer International Publishing

ER -

Social creation of pro-social preferences for collective action

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this