Social creation of pro-social preferences for collective action

Avinash Dixit, Simon Asher Levin

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

Pro-social preferences are thought to play a significant role in solving society’s collective action problems of providing public goods and reducing public bads. Societies can benefit by deliberately instilling and sustaining such preferences in their members. We construct a theoretical model to examine an intergenerational education process for this. We consider both a one-time action of this kind and a constitution that establishes a steady state, and compare the two.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationThe Theory of Externalities and Public Goods
Subtitle of host publicationEssays in Memory of Richard C. Cornes
PublisherSpringer International Publishing
Pages127-143
Number of pages17
ISBN (Electronic)9783319494425
ISBN (Print)9783319494418
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2017

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Mathematics(all)

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    Dixit, A., & Levin, S. A. (2017). Social creation of pro-social preferences for collective action. In The Theory of Externalities and Public Goods: Essays in Memory of Richard C. Cornes (pp. 127-143). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49442-5_7