@inproceedings{7b3907c77acd47eeb60069782236fb27,
title = "Smooth Fictitious Play in N × 2 Potential Games",
abstract = "The paper shows that smooth fictitious play converges to a neighborhood of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with probability 1 in almost all N × 2 (N-player, two-action) potential games. The neighborhood of convergence may be made arbitrarily small by taking the smoothing parameter to zero. Simple proof techniques are furnished by considering regular potential games.",
keywords = "Game theory, online learning, potential games, pure Nash equilibria, smooth fictitious play",
author = "Brian Swenson and Poor, {H. Vincent}",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2019 IEEE.; 53rd Asilomar Conference on Circuits, Systems and Computers, ACSSC 2019 ; Conference date: 03-11-2019 Through 06-11-2019",
year = "2019",
month = nov,
doi = "10.1109/IEEECONF44664.2019.9048995",
language = "English (US)",
series = "Conference Record - Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers",
publisher = "IEEE Computer Society",
pages = "1739--1743",
editor = "Matthews, {Michael B.}",
booktitle = "Conference Record - 53rd Asilomar Conference on Circuits, Systems and Computers, ACSSC 2019",
address = "United States",
}