Smooth Fictitious Play in N × 2 Potential Games

Brian Swenson, H. Vincent Poor

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

The paper shows that smooth fictitious play converges to a neighborhood of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with probability 1 in almost all N × 2 (N-player, two-action) potential games. The neighborhood of convergence may be made arbitrarily small by taking the smoothing parameter to zero. Simple proof techniques are furnished by considering regular potential games.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationConference Record - 53rd Asilomar Conference on Circuits, Systems and Computers, ACSSC 2019
EditorsMichael B. Matthews
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Pages1739-1743
Number of pages5
ISBN (Electronic)9781728143002
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2019
Event53rd Asilomar Conference on Circuits, Systems and Computers, ACSSC 2019 - Pacific Grove, United States
Duration: Nov 3 2019Nov 6 2019

Publication series

NameConference Record - Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers
Volume2019-November
ISSN (Print)1058-6393

Conference

Conference53rd Asilomar Conference on Circuits, Systems and Computers, ACSSC 2019
CountryUnited States
CityPacific Grove
Period11/3/1911/6/19

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Signal Processing
  • Computer Networks and Communications

Keywords

  • Game theory
  • online learning
  • potential games
  • pure Nash equilibria
  • smooth fictitious play

Cite this

Swenson, B., & Poor, H. V. (2019). Smooth Fictitious Play in N × 2 Potential Games. In M. B. Matthews (Ed.), Conference Record - 53rd Asilomar Conference on Circuits, Systems and Computers, ACSSC 2019 (pp. 1739-1743). [9048995] (Conference Record - Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers; Vol. 2019-November). IEEE Computer Society. https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEECONF44664.2019.9048995