Electric vehicles (EVs) are expected to be a major component of the smart grid. The rapid proliferation of EVs will introduce an unprecedented load on the existing electric grid due to the charging/discharging behavior of the EVs, thus motivating the need for novel approaches for routing EVs across the grid. In this paper, a novel game-theoretic framework for smart routing of EVs within the smart grid is proposed. The goal of this framework is to balance the electricity load across the grid while taking into account the traffic congestion and the waiting time at charging stations. The EV routing problem is formulated as a repeated noncooperative game. For this game, it is shown that selfish behavior of EVs will result in a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with the price of anarchy upper bounded by the 'variance' of the ground load induced by the residential, industrial, or commercial users. Moreover, the results are extended to capture the stochastic nature of induced ground load as well as the subjective behavior of the owners of EVs as captured by using notions from the behavioral framework of prospect theory. Simulation results provide new insights on more efficient energy pricing at charging stations and under more realistic grid conditions.