TY - GEN
T1 - Smart routing in smart grids
AU - Rasoul Etesami, S.
AU - Saad, Walid
AU - Mandayam, Narayan
AU - Vincent Poor, H.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 IEEE.
PY - 2017/6/28
Y1 - 2017/6/28
N2 - Electric vehicles (EVs) are expected to be a major component of the smart grid. The rapid proliferation of EVs will introduce an unprecedented load on the existing electric grid due to the charging/discharging behavior of the EVs, thus motivating the need for novel approaches for routing EVs across the grid. In this paper, a novel game-theoretic framework for smart routing of EVs within the smart grid is proposed. The goal of this framework is to balance the electricity load across the grid while taking into account the traffic congestion and the waiting time at charging stations. The EV routing problem is formulated as a repeated noncooperative game. For this game, it is shown that selfish behavior of EVs will result in a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with the price of anarchy upper bounded by the 'variance' of the ground load induced by the residential, industrial, or commercial users. Moreover, the results are extended to capture the stochastic nature of induced ground load as well as the subjective behavior of the owners of EVs as captured by using notions from the behavioral framework of prospect theory. Simulation results provide new insights on more efficient energy pricing at charging stations and under more realistic grid conditions.
AB - Electric vehicles (EVs) are expected to be a major component of the smart grid. The rapid proliferation of EVs will introduce an unprecedented load on the existing electric grid due to the charging/discharging behavior of the EVs, thus motivating the need for novel approaches for routing EVs across the grid. In this paper, a novel game-theoretic framework for smart routing of EVs within the smart grid is proposed. The goal of this framework is to balance the electricity load across the grid while taking into account the traffic congestion and the waiting time at charging stations. The EV routing problem is formulated as a repeated noncooperative game. For this game, it is shown that selfish behavior of EVs will result in a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with the price of anarchy upper bounded by the 'variance' of the ground load induced by the residential, industrial, or commercial users. Moreover, the results are extended to capture the stochastic nature of induced ground load as well as the subjective behavior of the owners of EVs as captured by using notions from the behavioral framework of prospect theory. Simulation results provide new insights on more efficient energy pricing at charging stations and under more realistic grid conditions.
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U2 - 10.1109/CDC.2017.8264036
DO - 10.1109/CDC.2017.8264036
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85046125603
T3 - 2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017
SP - 2599
EP - 2604
BT - 2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 56th IEEE Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017
Y2 - 12 December 2017 through 15 December 2017
ER -