Sharing the cost of a public good without subsidies

Marc Fleurbaey, Yves Sprumont

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations


We study the construction of a social ordering function for the case of a public good financed by contributions from the population. We extend the analysis of Maniquet and Sprumont (2004) to the case when cost shares cannot be negative, i.e., agents cannot receive subsidies from others. We adapt the Maniquet-Sprumont defense of public good welfare egalitarianism to this context. Weakening their Free Lunch Aversion axiom and adding a continuity requirement allows us to characterize the public good welfare maximin social ordering function.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-8
Number of pages8
JournalJournal of Public Economic Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - Feb 2009
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Economics and Econometrics


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