Abstract
Life insurers use reinsurance to move liabilities from regulated and rated companies that sell policies to shadow reinsurers, which are less regulated and unrated off-balance-sheet entities within the same insurance group. U.S. life insurance and annuity liabilities ceded to shadow reinsurers grew from $11 billion in 2002 to $364 billion in 2012. Life insurers using shadow insurance, which capture half of the market share, ceded 25 cents of every dollar insured to shadow reinsurers in 2012, up from 2 cents in 2002. By relaxing capital requirements, shadow insurance could reduce the marginal cost of issuing policies and thereby improve retail market efficiency. However, shadow insurance could also reduce risk-based capital and increase expected loss for the industry. We model and quantify these effects based on publicly available data and plausible assumptions.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 1265-1287 |
Number of pages | 23 |
Journal | Econometrica |
Volume | 84 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - May 1 2016 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Economics and Econometrics
Keywords
- Capital regulation
- Demand estimation
- Life insurance industry
- Regulatory arbitrage
- Reinsurance