Selfish random access: Equilibrium conditions and best-response learning

Hazer Inaltekin, Mung Chiang, H. Vincent Poor

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

This paper studies a class of random access games for wireless channels with multipacket reception. First, necessary and sufficient equilibrium conditions for a contention strategy profile to be a Nash equilibrium for general wireless channels are established. Then, applications of these equilibrium conditions for well-known channel models are illustrated. Various engineering insights and design ideas are provided. Finally, the results are extended to an incomplete information game setting, and best-response learning dynamics leading to Nash equilibria are investigated.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationGame Theory for Networks - Second International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Revised Selected Papers
Pages169-181
Number of pages13
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 31 2012
Event2nd International ICST Conference on Game Theory in Networks, GAMENETS 2011 - Shanghai, China
Duration: Apr 16 2011Apr 18 2011

Publication series

NameLecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
Volume75 LNICST
ISSN (Print)1867-8211

Other

Other2nd International ICST Conference on Game Theory in Networks, GAMENETS 2011
CountryChina
CityShanghai
Period4/16/114/18/11

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Networks and Communications

Keywords

  • Slotted ALOHA
  • contention control
  • game theory
  • medium access control
  • multipacket reception

Cite this

Inaltekin, H., Chiang, M., & Poor, H. V. (2012). Selfish random access: Equilibrium conditions and best-response learning. In Game Theory for Networks - Second International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Revised Selected Papers (pp. 169-181). (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering; Vol. 75 LNICST). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_12