TY - JOUR
T1 - Secure Survey Design in Organizations
T2 - Theory and Experiments
AU - Chassang, Sylvain
AU - Zehnder, Christian
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© (2024), (American Economic Association). All Rights Reserved.
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - We study secure survey designs in organizational settings where fear of retaliation makes it hard to elicit truth. Theory predicts that (i) randomized-response techniques offer no improvement because they are strategically equivalent to direct elicitation, (ii) exogenously distorting survey responses (hard garbling) can improve information transmission, and (iii) the impact of survey design on reporting can be estimated in equilibrium. Laboratory experiments confirm that hard garbling outperforms direct elicitation but randomized response works better than expected. False accusations slightly but persistently bias treatment effect estimates. Additional experiments reveal that play converges to equilibrium if learning from others’ experience is possible.
AB - We study secure survey designs in organizational settings where fear of retaliation makes it hard to elicit truth. Theory predicts that (i) randomized-response techniques offer no improvement because they are strategically equivalent to direct elicitation, (ii) exogenously distorting survey responses (hard garbling) can improve information transmission, and (iii) the impact of survey design on reporting can be estimated in equilibrium. Laboratory experiments confirm that hard garbling outperforms direct elicitation but randomized response works better than expected. False accusations slightly but persistently bias treatment effect estimates. Additional experiments reveal that play converges to equilibrium if learning from others’ experience is possible.
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U2 - 10.1257/mic.20220187
DO - 10.1257/mic.20220187
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:105001339794
SN - 1945-7669
VL - 16
SP - 371
EP - 405
JO - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
JF - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
IS - 4
ER -