TY - JOUR
T1 - Secure Relaying in Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access
T2 - Trusted and Untrusted Scenarios
AU - Arafa, Ahmed
AU - Shin, Wonjae
AU - Vaezi, Mojtaba
AU - Poor, H. Vincent
N1 - Funding Information:
This work was supported in part by the U.S. National Science Foundation under Grant CCF-0939370 and Grant CCF-1513915, and in part by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Science, ICT & Future Planning under Grant NRF-2019R1C1C1006806.
Funding Information:
Manuscript received August 22, 2018; revised January 28, 2019 and March 19, 2019; accepted March 28, 2019. Date of publication April 15, 2019; date of current version September 11, 2019. This work was supported in part by the U.S. National Science Foundation under Grant CCF-0939370 and Grant CCF-1513915, and in part by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Science, ICT & Future Planning under Grant NRF-2019R1C1C1006806. This paper was presented in part at the IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), Abu Dhabi, UAE, December 2018 [1], and in part at the Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems, and Computers, Pacific Grove, CA, USA, October 2018 [2]. The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Prof. Qian Wang. (Corresponding author: Wonjae Shin.) A. Arafa and H. V. Poor are with the Electrical Engineering Department, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA (e-mail: aarafa@princeton.edu; poor@princeton.edu).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2005-2012 IEEE.
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - A downlink single-input single-output non-orthogonal multiple access setting is considered, in which a base station (BS) is communicating with two legitimate users in two possible scenarios of unsecure environments: existence of an external eavesdropper and communicating through an untrusted relay. For the first scenario, a number of trusted cooperative half-duplex relays is employed to assist with the BS's transmission and secure its signals from the external eavesdropper. Various relaying schemes are proposed and analyzed for that matter: cooperative jamming, decode-and-forward, and amplify-and-forward. For each scheme, secure beamforming signals are devised at the relays to maximize the achievable secrecy rate regions. For the second scenario, with the untrusted relay, achievable secrecy rate regions are derived for two different relaying schemes, compress-and-forward and amplify-and-forward, under two different modes of operation. In the first mode, coined passive user mode, the users receive signals from both the BS and the untrusted relay and combine them to decode their messages. In the second mode, termed the active user mode, the users transmit a cooperative jamming signal simultaneously with the BS's transmission to further confuse the relay. Focusing on half-duplex nodes, the users cannot receive the BS's signal while jamming the relay, i.e., while being active, and rely only on the signals forwarded to them by the relay. It is shown that the best relaying scheme highly depends on the system parameters, in particular the distances between the nodes, and also on the part of the secrecy rate region at which the system is to operate.
AB - A downlink single-input single-output non-orthogonal multiple access setting is considered, in which a base station (BS) is communicating with two legitimate users in two possible scenarios of unsecure environments: existence of an external eavesdropper and communicating through an untrusted relay. For the first scenario, a number of trusted cooperative half-duplex relays is employed to assist with the BS's transmission and secure its signals from the external eavesdropper. Various relaying schemes are proposed and analyzed for that matter: cooperative jamming, decode-and-forward, and amplify-and-forward. For each scheme, secure beamforming signals are devised at the relays to maximize the achievable secrecy rate regions. For the second scenario, with the untrusted relay, achievable secrecy rate regions are derived for two different relaying schemes, compress-and-forward and amplify-and-forward, under two different modes of operation. In the first mode, coined passive user mode, the users receive signals from both the BS and the untrusted relay and combine them to decode their messages. In the second mode, termed the active user mode, the users transmit a cooperative jamming signal simultaneously with the BS's transmission to further confuse the relay. Focusing on half-duplex nodes, the users cannot receive the BS's signal while jamming the relay, i.e., while being active, and rely only on the signals forwarded to them by the relay. It is shown that the best relaying scheme highly depends on the system parameters, in particular the distances between the nodes, and also on the part of the secrecy rate region at which the system is to operate.
KW - Non-orthogonal multiple access
KW - amplify-and-forward
KW - compress-and-forward
KW - cooperative jamming
KW - decode-and-forward
KW - physical layer security
KW - trusted relays
KW - untrusted relays
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U2 - 10.1109/TIFS.2019.2911162
DO - 10.1109/TIFS.2019.2911162
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85072156830
SN - 1556-6013
VL - 15
SP - 210
EP - 222
JO - IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
JF - IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
IS - 1
M1 - 8691580
ER -